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T HE tremendous emergency call issued for trained airmen when
the United States in 1917 entered the war brought about the estab-
lishment of a goodly number of training fields which were very
much in the nature of airports though some of them were not suffi-
ciently near to a city to serve the real purposes of commerce. When
the war closed and the air mail service came into its own some of these
training fields were utilized by the postoffice as airports and of these a
number at least are in use today for that purpose. However this was
but an adaptation and could not long fill the need which had been created.
Since airports are even more necessary to air navigation than are
harbors to water navigation, the question of procuring them in proper
number and at the proper places soon became pressing. The military
airports in addition to privately owned flying fields were the only
facilities available and were clearly insufficient to fill the needs. Turn-
ing military fields over to the postoffice department did not improve
matters in the least. The imperative need was for more airports. The
question therefore arose who was to establish and maintain these ports
-the general government or the local communities.
This question the federal authorities decided in favor of the local
communities. "It was felt that these local communities were better
able to do this essential work, that it was good policy to get them
directly interested in the matter and that the federal government
should keep its hands off except so far as regulation is concerned. It
was therefore provided by the Air Commerce Act of 1926 that when-
ever the Postmaster General and the Secretary of Commerce should
by joint order so direct, the airways under the jurisdiction and control
of the Postmaster General togetler with all emergency landing fields
and other air navigation facilities shall be transferred to the jurisdic-
tion and control of the Secretary of Commerce and the established
airports and terminal landing fields may be transferred to the jurisdic-
tion and control of the municipalities concerned under arrangements
subject to the approval of the president.' In consequence federal air-
ports suitable for city airports have been generally turned over to the
particular city whose purposes they are adapted to serve.
Of course this action was not sufficient to supply the fast increasing
* Professor of Law, Marquette University; author of Law of the Air.
"Air Commerce Act 1926 Section 5.
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need. The need for airports is felt in every city of any size. Only a
few are fortunate enough to have an airport presented to them by the
Federal Government. The others, unless they choose to remain alien
to the new development, have to rely on private landing fields or es-
tablish airports as a municipal venture. This raises a new question of
municipal law, which has been presented to numerous legislatures and
to a few courts. Accordingly eighteen states have already enacted
statutes authorizing cities to acquire land for the establishment and
equipment of airports and four of these provide for proceeding to
condemn land for this purpose.2
Of course statutes alone will not settle the matter, for the validity
of these statutes is under our system a judicial question which must be
solved by the courts. The first question which the courts will have to
answer will be whether the establishment, construction, improvement,
equipment, maintenance and operation of such ports is a proper "city
purpose" under constitutional provisions which forbids a city from
incurring any indebtedness except for city purposes. Obviously an air-
port involves considerable expense particularly where it must be es-
tablished anew and is not presented by the Federal Government to the
city on a silver platter. In view of this situation a very recent decision
by the Supreme Court of New York handed down October 6, 1928
and dealing with the power of the city of Utica, New York, is of
very great interest.
The court in this case says that what constitutes a city purpose
cannot be stated with exactness. Something which fifty, years ago
would not have been such a purpose may today be clearly authorized
by the constitution. The question is a changing one and adapts itself
to industrial inventions and developments and to new social conditions.
The law not being a fixed and rigid system develops, a living thing, as
the industrial and social elements which form it make their impelling
growth. The constitutional provision will therefore be construed in
view of the conditions existing at the time when the question is raised.
Judicial notice will be taken that aviation is no longer an experiment,
that large sums are invested in airports by municipalities and that
commercial and passenger lines have been established and carry passen-
gers, mail and express. In view of such extensive development the
legislature is justified in determining that the building of an airport is a
city purpose as much as is the building of a bridge or a dock.3
In a Maryland case decided on April II, 1928 the question was
whether an act to authorize the city of Baltimore to issue city bonds
2 Louisiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania and Washington. See U.- S. Aviation
Repors, 1928 for a reprint of all these statutes.
'Hesse v. Rath 23o N.Y. Supp. 676.
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to an amount not exceeding $I,500,000 for the purpose of acquiring
land and improvements for establishing an airport for land and sea
planes was constitutional. The attack was made on six highly technical
grounds none of which involved the question whether the legislature
had power to recognize an airport as a municipal purpose. This point
was apparently conceded by counsel and the court overruled their
technical contentions and declared that the bonds were valid obligations.4
In Nebraska a bond issue of the city of Lincoln was objected to
by the auditor of public accounts on the ground that the aviation field
in connection with which the bonds were issued was not a "public
service property" or a "public utility" within the meaning of the Home
Rule Charter of the City, which charter did not enumerate an aviation
field specifically. The court on mandamus overruled this objection
saying:
An equipped aviation field in or near the city is a means of
making aerial service available to passengers. The service in-
cludes the transportation of mail and freight. The field is
furnished for a public purpose for which taxes may be imposed
in the exercise of governmental power.5
Most airports are established far away from the business center and
in many cases even beyond the corporate limits of the city. The ques-
tion whether an airport beyond the city limits is a proper municipal
utility has been raised in Ohio.. The constitution of that state provides
that any municipality may acquire, construct, own, lease and operate
within or without its limits any public utility the- services of which
are or are to be supplied to the municipality or its inhabitants. The court
held that if there had been any doubt as to the right of the city of
Cleveland to acquire, own or operate an air landing field it had been
removed by a statute conferring express authority for establishing
landing fields either within or without the limits of a municipality and
declaring this to be a public purpose.6
The best reasoned case on the subject has arisen in Kansas. The
question-there raised was whether a-city of the first class could acquire
and maintain an airport as part of a municipal park, situated outside
if its corporate limits. The court pointed out that park purposes, have
been construed to include a race track, a tourist camp, bridle trails,
boating, bathing, refreshment and lunch stands, a waiting room for
street cars, a refreshment and shelter room for the public, a grand
stand, a baseball diamond, a tennis -court, croquet grounds, childrens'
play grouids, restaurants, museums, art galleries, zo6logical and
botanical gardens, conservatories and many other recreational and
4 Douty v. Maryland 141 At. 499 (Md.).
r State v. Johniton 220 N.W. 273 (Neb.).
' State v. Cleveland 16o N.E. 241 (Ohio).
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educational facilities, and that in short a park may be devoted to any
use which tends to promote popular enjoyment and recreation. The
court then stressed the importance of airways stating that they are
more than mere air lines and are material and permanent ways through
the air laid out with the precision and care which an engineer adopts
in choosing the course of a railway and that airports are essential parts
of such airlines. As to airports the court then says after pointing
out that airways are essentially federal undertakings:
The maintenance of airports, however, comes legitimately within the
scope of the municipality in much the same manner as docks and harbor
facilities for marine shipping. Airports are said to be as important to
commerce as are terminals to railroads or harbors to navigation.
Municipalities are studying local conditions and commercial organiza-
tions are pressing the importance of establishing terminal airports and
of providing proper lighting for landing fields, and facilities such as
hangars, garages, and repair shops. The possession of the airport by
the modern city is essential if it desires opportunities for increased
prosperity to be secured through air commerce. Lands susceptible of
improvement as parks, playgrounds, or general recreational purposes,
may be utilized and developed around the modern airport so that the
municipality may bring to itself not only the advantages of air com-
merce but afford its citizens those other inestimable advantages of
improved beautification and healthgiving opportunities. It is said that
there were 3,800 landing fields in the United States in 1926 of which
400 were municipal. See 1927 Aircraft Yearbook p. ioi et seq. In a
dozen cities of the Far West (California, Oregon, etc.) projects for
new airports or improvements of existing facilities are under way at an
estimated cost of more than $8,ooo,ooo. American City, July, 1927. In
these rapidly changing times, even a wise man cannot discern the needs
of the future. All signs indicate that in another 25 years airports may
be needed for tourists as much as tourist camps are at this time needed
for those on recreation or pleasure bent. Perhaps it may not be a
"great way" into what ordinarily would be termed the "far and distant
future" when the human race will be flying with wings similar to those
described by Bulwer Lytton in "The Coming Race." In any event, we
are of opinion that the airport or landing field is as properly included
within park purposes as tourist camps and other named recreational
objects, and that the board of park commissioners of Wichita is
authorized and empowered, under the provisions of chapter 117 of the
Law of 1927, to proceed to purchase or condemn the lands in question
for the purposes stated.7
The fact that in all these cases the power of the city to do what it
proposed to do was sustained is significant. The necessity of an air-
port, if a city is not hopelessly to fall in the rear of the progress of
the world, is so patent that courts apparently will deny it such powers
only if the legal limitations are such that the courts are unable to find
'Wichita v. Clapp 125 Kan. IOO, 263 Pac. 12.
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an avenue of escape from them. Courts in such matters however are
ingenious and can be relied upon to find the avenue if there is one
and perhaps in cases where there is no avenue they may discover a
back alley or a subterranean channel or may boldly and in some
measure appropriately escape from their predicament by some air
route.
No cases on the liability of a city for accidents which may occur
in connection with airports have as yet been decided. The question
has however arisen particularly in connection with balloon ascensions
whether the fair association or other body which sponsored the ascen-
sion was liable for any mishap which occurred in connection with it.
Of course the purpose of these ascensions or flights was amusement
not commerce but the cases may nevertheless be of some use by way
of comparison. Fair associations have been held liable for such mis-
haps as an aeroplane striking a spectator with its wings," a balloon
carrying up a bystander by its rope and anchor,9 and even for a
collision of a person outside of the grounds with the abandoned balloon
after the operator had made a parachute jump.'0 An amusement
company has been held responsible for the damages caused to one of
its patrons by the breaking of a cleat, its duty being to have this cleat
fastened securely enough to resist the pressure which the balloon was
exerting in addition to what the spectators were adding to the burden."
A Virginia Street Car company which in order to increase its traffic
engaged an aeronaut to make a balloon ascension in a park along its
line has been held responsible for the death of a little boy who was
killed by the fall of one of the poles which was used to hold up the
balloon though no admission to the park was charged. 2
In all these cases the defendants were either pure amusement com-
panies or county fair associations, and in one case a street car company,
which latter two cases contained some elements of public utility. In
view of these cases the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
absolving the Wisconsin State Board of Agriculture from liability for
8Platt v. Erie County Agricultural Society i49 N.Y. Supp. 520, 164 App,
Div. 99.
'Roper v. Ulster County Agricultural Society 12o N.Y. Supp. 644, 136 App.
Div. 97; Smith v. Cumberland Agricultural Society 163 N.C. 346, 79 S.E. 632,
Ann. Cas 1915 B. 544- But see Bernier v. Woodstock Agricultural Society 88
Conn. 558, 92 Ati. 16o, where the person killed had intentionally connected him-
self with the rope of the balloon.
"0 Canney v. Rochester Agricultural and Mechanical Association, 76 N.H. 6o,
79 Atl. 517.
" Peckett v. Bergen Beach Co., 6o N.Y. Supp. 966, 44 App. Div. 559-
"Richmond and Manchester Ry. Co. v. Moore 94 Va. 493, 27 S.E. 70, 37
L.R.A. 258, 2 Am. Neg. Rep. 473.
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a mishap occasioned by a competent aeronaut to a spectator at the
state fair grounds near Milwaukee for the reason that such board was
a governmental agency 13 is of considerable interest. The question
will soon have to be solved whether a city in establishing and main-
taining an airport acts in its governmental or in its mere business
capacity. It seems to the writer that it is clearly acting in its govern-
mental capacity.
In one other aspect these amusement cases may be of value. It
has been held in Maryland that the proprietor of an amusement resort
who employed a competent aeronaut to make a balloon ascension as
an independent contractor was not liable for the negligence of such
contractor in hoisting the pole by which the balloon was held up over
a carpenter's horse whence it slipped injuring the plaintiff.1 4 This
case is important since most if not all who will use a city's airport
will be such independent contractors though they will pay for their
accommodations instead of being paid for their services.
Mr. Logan in a very recent book15 points out that the rule which
makes proprietors of places to which the public is generally invited
liable for injuries occurring by reason of the proprietor's negligence,
active or otherwise, will probably be extended to aviation fields. This
rule in the past has been applied to union stations, 6, theaters, 7 fair
grounds,' circuses,19 race tracks, 20 baseball parks, 2' amusement parks, 22
and stores. 21 Its extension, certainly to private aviation fields, is almost
a foregone conclusion. The cases and analogies with which to solve
the forthcoming problems of the damage liability of cities for injuries
occuring at airports to employees, passengers, licensees and trespassers
are therefore at hand. The cases as they arise will bear watching
and will be very interesting but will contain no new doctrine.
'Morrison. v. MacLaren. 16o Wis. 621, 152 N.W. 475, L.R.A. 1915, E. 469.
'nSmith v. Be~nick 87 Md. 61o, 41 Atd. 56, 42 L.R.A. 277, 4 Am. Neg. Cas.
641. See also Burns v. Herman 48 Colo. 359, 113 Pac. 310.
" Aircraft Law Made Plain pp. 66 and 67.
Union Depot and Ry. Co. v. Londoner 50 Colo. 22, 114 Pac. 316, 33 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 433.
" Weiner v. Scherer 117 N.Y. Supp. ioo8, 64 Misc. Rep. 82.
'Higgins v. Franklin County Agricultural Soc., IoO Me. 565, 62 Atl. 708.
King v. Ringling 145 Mo. App. 285, 130 S.W. 482.
' Hart v. Washington Park Club 157 I1. 9, 41 N.E. 620.
' Crane v. Kansas City Baseball and Exhibition Co., 168 Mo. App. 301, 153
S.W. 1O76.
' Wodnik v. Luma Park Amusement Co., 69 Wash. 638, 125 Pac. 941.
' Mullen v. Sensenbrenner Merc. Co., 260 S.W. 982 33 A.L.R. 176 (Mo.)
Scott v. Kline's Inc. 284 S.W. 831 (Mo. App.).
